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Abstract. Identity-based encryption (IBE) has been extensively stud-
ied and widely used in various applications since Boneh and Franklin
proposed the first practical scheme based on pairing. In that seminal
work, it has also been pointed out that providing an efficient revocation
mechanism for IBE is essential. Hence, revocable identity-based encryp-
tion (RIBE) has been proposed in the literature to offer an efficient
revocation mechanism. In contrast to revocation, another issue that will
also occur in practice is to combine two or multiple IBE systems into
one system, e.g., due to the merge of the departments or companies.
However, this issue has not been formally studied in the literature and
the naive solution of creating a completely new system is inefficient. In
order to efficiently address this problem, in this paper we propose the
notion of mergeable and revocable identity-based encryption (MRIBE).
Our scheme provides the first solution to efficiently revoke users and
merge multiple IBE systems into a single system. The proposed scheme
also has several nice features: when two systems are merged, there is
no secure channel needed for the purpose of updating user private keys;
and the size of the user private key remains unchanged when multiple
systems are merged. We also propose a new security model for MRIBE,
which is an extension of the security model for RIBE, and prove that the
proposed scheme is semantically secure without random oracles.
Keywords: Identity-based encryption · Revocation · Merging
1 Introduction
Public key encryption is themost basic primitive of public key cryptography. How-
ever, it suffers from the key distribution and management problem. To overcome
this drawback, identity-based encryption (IBE) has been proposed, and it pro-
vides a new paradigm for public key encryption [2,3,5,20]. IBE uses the identity
string (e.g. emails or IP addresses) of a user as the public key of that user. The
sender using an IBE does not need to look up the public keys and the correspond-
ing certificates of the receivers, because the identities together with common pub-
lic parameters are sufficient for encryption. The private keys of all the users are
generated by a private key generator (PKG) which is a fully trusted third party.
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Revocation is an essential requirement in a cryptographic system when a
user’s key is compromised and/or any misuse is noticed. In PKI, revocation
is done via certificate revocation lists (CRLs). However, IBE cannot apply this
approach since there is no certificate in the system. Boneh and Franklin provided
the first practical IBE scheme, and they also proposed a revocation mechanism by
appending the timestamp in each identity string, but the workload of updating
the private key is linear to the size of the non-revoked users. To address this
issues, some practical Revocable IBE (RIBE) schemes have been proposed [1,
11,15]. Boldyreva et al. [1] proposed the first practical RIBE scheme with the
authority’s periodic workload to be logarithmic in the number of users while
keeping the scheme efficient in both encryption and decryption. However, their
RIBE scheme limits the number of users in the system. To overcome this problem,
they proposed a method to double the number of users in the system. However,
the size of the private key for each user is also increased whenever the size of
the system is increased. Some following works [11,15] have focused on improving
the security from selective security to adaptive security.
RIBE schemes are useful in many applications such as email systems and
data storage systems by disallowing unauthorised or revoked users to access
encrypted sensitive information in those systems. However, in practice it is also
possible that two or more IBE systems need to be merged due to various rea-
sons. As an example, a university wants to merge two departments: information
technology (IT) and computer science (CS). A naive approach to address this
issue is creating a completely new system and re-generating the public parame-
ter and private keys for all users. However, this approach is impractical since a
new private key needs to be generated for all the users in the combined system
and a secure channel needs to be established between each user and the PKG
for key distribution.
In this paper, we propose a new notion called mergeable and revocable
identity-based encryption (MRIBE) to solve the above problem. Our scheme
inherits the advantage of RIBE schemes by allowing the authority (i.e., PKG)
to efficiently revoke users. In addition, our scheme allows different systems to
be merged into a single system while keeping the size of the user private key
unchanged. Also, there is no secure channel needed for updating the user private
keys during the merging process.
1.1 Related Work
The concept of identity-based cryptography was introduced by Shamir [19], but
the first practical IBE scheme was proposed by Boneh and Franklin in 2001 [3]
and the scheme is proved secure in the random oracle model. Since the random
oracle model is an idealised model, Boneh and Boyen [2] proposed a selectively
security IBE scheme without random oracles in 2004. One year later, Waters [20]
proposed a new IBE scheme with adaptive security in the standard model, but
the size of the public parameter depends on the length of the user identity. To
reduce the size of the public parameter, Gentry [5] proposed another IBE scheme
in the standard model, but its security is based on a non-standard assumption.
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RIBE is an extension of IBE by providing an efficient revocation mechanism.
The issue of revocation in IBE has been pointed out by Boneh and Franklin in
their seminal work [3]. They suggested that users renew their private keys peri-
odically by representing an identity as ID‖T where ID is the real identity and
T is the current time. However, such an approach is inefficient and not scalable
because a secure channel between the PKG and each user needs to be established
each time, and the workload of generating new private keys is linear in the num-
ber of non-revoked users in each revocation epoch. Hanaoka et al. [8] proposed
an approach that the users periodically renew their private keys without inter-
acting with the PKG but each user needs to posses a tamper-resistant hardware
device. This assumption makes the solution rather impractical. Boldyreva et al.
[1] introduced a scalable but selectively secure RIBE by utilizing several tech-
niques including fuzzy identity-based encryption [13], secret sharing [19] and the
tree-based revocation method proposed for broadcast encryption [4,7,10,12,21].
Libert and Vergnaud [11] proposed the first adaptively secure RIBE scheme.
Seo and Emura [15] improved the security model in [1] to prevent decryption
key exposure attacks. Lee et al. [9] proposed a RIBE scheme by utilizing subset
difference (SD) method instead of the Complete Subtree (CS) method which is
used in all previous works. Recently, the techniques used in RIBE have also been
extended to achieve revocable hierarchical identity-based encryption (RHIBE)
[14,16,17].
1.2 Our Contributions
In this work, we propose a new cryptographic notion named mergeable and
revocable identity-based encryption (MRIBE), which is an extension of revoca-
ble identity-based encryption (RIBE). The proposed MRIBE scheme inherits all
the nice properties of RIBE, in particular the property of allowing efficient revo-
cation, and also allows multiple IBE systems to be merged into a single system,
which makes it more versatile in handling the dynamics that could occur in real
applications.
We also give a new security model for MRIBE by extending of the security
model for RIBE and prove that the proposed scheme is semantically secure in
the standard model. Our scheme is based on RIBE by introducing several new
algorithms to handle the merging functionality. The proposal scheme also has
some several nice features: there is no secure channel needed for key update
during the merging process; and the size of user private key remains unchanged
when multiple systems are merged, which makes the system scalable.
1.3 Paper Organization
Some preliminaries are introduced in the next section. In Sect. 3, we provide
definitions for the MRIBE scheme and its security model. We then present our
MRIBE construction in Sect. 4. The security proof of the proposed scheme is
provided in Sect. 5. Finally, we summarize our result in Sect. 6.
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2 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the notations used in this paper and review
the definitions for bilinear map and pseudorandom function family. We also
review some cryptographic primitives, including threshold secret sharing scheme,
fuzzy identity-based encryption scheme, and revocable identity-based encryption
scheme.
2.1 Notations
Let N denote the set of all natural numbers, and for n ∈ N, we define [n] :=
{1, ..., n}. “x ← y” denotes that x is chosen uniformly at random from y if y is a
finite set, x is output from y if y is a function or an algorithm, or y is assigned to
x otherwise. If x and y are strings, then “|x|” denotes the bit-length of x, “x‖y”
denotes the concatenation of x and y. For a finite set S, “|S|” denotes its size
and S[i] denotes the i-th value in the set S. If A is a probabilistic algorithm,
then “y ← A(x; r)” denotes that A computes y as output by taking x as input
and using r as randomness, and we just write “y ← A(x)” if we do not need
to make the randomness used by A explicit. If furthermore O is a function
or an algorithm, then “AO” means that A has oracle access to O. A function
(k) : N → [0, 1] is said to be negligible if for all positive polynomials p(k) and
all sufficiently large k ∈ N, we have (k) < 1/p(k). Throughout this paper, we
use the character “k” to denote a security parameter.
2.2 Bilinear Map
Let G and GT be two cyclic multiplicative groups of prime order p and g be a
generator of G. The map e : G × G → GT is said to be an admissible bilinear
pairing if the following properties hold true.
1. Bilinearity: for all u, v ∈ G and a, b ∈ Zp, e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab.
2. Non-degeneration: e(g, g) = 1.
3. Computability: it is efficient to compute e(u, v) for any u.v ∈ G.
We say that (G,GT ) are bilinear map groups if there exists a bilinear pairing
e : G × G → GT as above.
2.3 Pseudorandom Function Family
Goldreich, Goldwasser and Micali [6] introduced approaches to constructing ran-
dom functions in 1984. In this section, we review the definition of pseudorandom
function and pseudorandom function family.
Definition 1 (Pseudorandom Function). Let k ∈ N be a security parameter.
A function family F is associated with {Seedk}k∈N, {Domk}k∈N and {Rngk}k∈N.
Formally, for any
∑ ← Seedk,D ←
∑
and R ← Rngk, Fk,
∑
,D,R
ω defines a
function which maps an element of D to an element of R. That is, Fk,
∑
,D,R
ω (ρ) ∈
R for any ρ ∈ D.
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Definition 2 (Pseudorandom Function Family). F is a pseudorandom
function family if Fk,
∑
,D,R
ω (ρi) and RF (ρi) computational indistinguishability
for any ρi ∈ D adaptively chosen by any polynomial time distinguisher, where
RF is a truly random function. That is, for any ρ ∈ D, RF (ρ) ← R.
2.4 Threshold Secret Sharing Scheme
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [18] divides a secret s into n pieces s1, ..., sn
using a unique polynomial of degree (t − 1), any t out of n shares may be used
to recover the secret. The details are shown as follow.
Choose a group Zp and p ≥ n. Each user ui is associated with a public unique
number ui ∈ Zp and the user set U = {u1, ..., un}. Choose a random k−1 degree
polynomial p(x) = s+
∏k−1
i=1 aix
i where ai ∈ Z∗p. Each user in U obtains a share
si = p(ui). When k users come together and form a set J ⊆ U, the secret s can
be recovered by utilizing Lagrange coefficient and polynomial interpolation. For
x, i ∈ Z, set J ⊂ Z the Lagrange coefficient Δi,J(x) is defined as
Δi,J(x) =
∏
j∈J,j =i
(
x − j
i − j
)
.
To recover p(x), we have following equation:
p(x) =
∑
i∈J
si · Δi,J(x).
Hence, we can recover the secret key s by setting the element x is equal to 0:
s = p(0) =
∑
i∈J
si · Δi,J(0).
2.5 Fuzzy Identity-Based Encryption Scheme
Sahai and Waters [13] proposed a new type of identity-based encryption scheme
called fuzzy identity-based encryption. It is the first attribute-based encryption
scheme. There are two schemes, one has to define the universe in the setup
phase, and the other one has a large universe. In the large universe construction,
it utilizes all elements of Z∗p as the universe and defines the following function
to cooperate Shamir’s secret sharing scheme to recover the plaintext from the
ciphertext with J attributes. For x ∈ Z; J ⊂ Z; g, h1, ..., h|J| ∈ G, we define
Hg,J,h1,...,h|J|
def= gx
|J|−1
|J|∏
i=1
(
h
Δi,J(x)
i
)
The large universe construction can be used to build revocable identity-based
encryption scheme as follows. The private key generation centre issues the private
key for every user based on the identity ω and the time t in each revocation epoch
for the non-revoked user. The ciphertext is encrypted under the identity ω and
time t. So the revoked users cannot decrypt the ciphertext since they do not
have valid time t component.
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2.6 Identity-Based Encryption with Revocation Scheme
Boldyreva, Goyal and Kumar [1] points out that the revocation list can be imple-
mented by the complete subtree method [12]. Since our proposed scheme is
mergeable, we slightly modify their revocation scheme. Let xc denote the chil-
dren of node x. For the root node, it has 2 or more degrees since the mergence,
which is differ to the previous work [1]. For the non-root node, it only has two
children xl and xr. The detail of revocation algorithm is described as follows.
The function KUNodes takes three parameters as input, a binary tree T,
revocation list rl and time t. It outputs a set of nodes, which is the minimal set
of nodes in the binary tree T such that the non-revoked nodes have at least one
ancestor or themselves in the set and none of revoked nodes in revocation list
rl have any ancestor or themselves in the set. The function operates as follows.
First it marks all the ancestors of revoked nodes as revoked into the set X, then
output all the non-revoked children of revoked nodes in the set Y. Here is a
formal specification.
KUNodes(T, rl, t)
X,Y ← ∅
∀(vi, ti) ∈ rl if ti ≤ t then add Path(vi) to X
∀x ∈ X if xc ∈ X then add xc to Y
If Y = ∅ then add root to Y
Return Y
Our scheme is based on the binary tree except the root node has more than
two children. After merging, our revocation tree improves the degree of the root
node rather than the depth of the binary tree. Let N denote the number of user
for each system and NS denote the number of systems. Our tree structure keeps
the unchanged size of depth log2 N . Thus the number of the private key for
each user remains unchanged log2 N . After merging all NS system, the new root
node has 2NS degrees. It improves the width NS times compared to the original
revocation tree. However, this tree structure does not reduce the efficient since
NS is not a significant number and we can re-build the whole system if NS is
too large.
3 Formal Definitions and Security Models
3.1 Syntax of Mergeable and Revocable IBE
We start with defining the general syntax of a Mergeable and Revocable IBE
scheme. We recall and modify the definition of revocable IBE schemes as defined
in [1]. Each algorithm is run by one of following parties - key authority, sender
or receiver. The key authority maintains a revocation list rl and state st. We
define parameter NS as the number of system in our proposed scheme and use
the Greek characters as the subscript to represent the instantiations of different
systems in this section and following sections.
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Definition 3 (Mergeable and Revocable IBE). A mergeable and revocable
identity-based encryption scheme MRIBE = (S,SK,KU ,DK, E ,D,R,MP,
MSK,SKU) is defined by ten algorithms and has associated message space M,
identity space I and time space T . In what follows, we call an algorithm stateful
only if it updates rl or st.
The stateful Setup algorithm S is run by the key authority. Given a security
parameter k, a maximal number of users N and a number of systems NS, it
outputs one public parameters pp which shares to all NS systems, and generates
a public key pki, a master secret key mski, a revocation list rli and a state sti
for each system (i ∈ {1, ..., NS}).
The stateful Private Key Generation algorithm SK is run by the key author-
ity. Given the information of the public key, the master secret key and the state
(pki,mski, statei) in system i and an identity ω ∈ I, it outputs private key skω,i
and an updated state sti.
The Key Update algorithm KU is run by the key authority. Given the infor-
mation of the public key, the master secret key, the revocation list and state
(pki,mski, rli, sti) in system i and a revocation epoch t ∈ T , it outputs a key
update kut,i.
The Decryption Key Generation algorithm DK is run by the receiver. Given
a private key skω,i and a key update kut,i, it outputs decryption key dkω,t,i or a
special symbol ⊥ indicating that ω was revoked.
The Encryption algorithm E is run by the sender. Given a public key pki in
system i and an identity ω ∈ I, an encryption time t ∈ T and a message m ∈ M,
it outputs a ciphertext ci. For simplicity and w.l.o.g. we assume that ω and t are
efficiently computable from ci.
The Decryption algorithm D is run by the receiver. Given a decryption key
dkω,t,i and a ciphertext ci, it outputs a message m ∈ M or a special symbol ⊥
indicating that the ciphertext is invalid.
The stateful Revocation algorithm R is run by the key authority. Given an
identity to be the revoked ω ∈ I, revocation list rli and state sti in system i and
revocation time t ∈ T it outputs updated revocation list rli.
The stateful Merge Parameter algorithm MP is run by the key authority.
Given the public key pkα, the master key mskα, the revocation list rlα and the
state stα in system α, the public key pkβ, the master key mskβ, the revocation
list rlβ and the state stβ in system β, it outputs updated revocation list rlβ and
state stβ.
The Merge Private Key algorithm MSK is run by the key authority. Given
the public key pkα, the master key mskα and the state stα in system α, the public
key pkβ, the master key mkβ and the state stβ in system β and an identity ω ∈ I,
it outputs a mergeable private key skω,α,β.
The Private Key Update algorithm SKU is run by the receiver. Given the
private key skω,α and the mergeable private key skω,α,β, it outputs the private
key skω,β.
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Correctness requires that, for any outputs of S, any m ∈ M, ω ∈ I and
t ∈ T , all possible states and revocation lists, the following experiments return
1 with probability 1:
– The key authority generates all public parameters for NS systems:
(pp, {pki,mski, rli, sti}i∈{1,...,NS}) ← S(k,N,NS);α, β ← {1, ..., NS}.
– ω1 is a valid user in system α:
(skω1,α, stα) ← SK(pkα,mskα, stα, ω1); kut,α ← KU(pkα,mskα, rlα, stα, t);
dkω1,t,α ← DK(skω1,α, kut,α); c1 ← E(pkα, ω1, t,m1).
If D(dkω1,t,α, c1) = m1 then return 0; else return 1
– ω2 is a revoked user in system β:
(skω2,β , stβ) ← SK(pkβ ,mskβ , stβ , ω2); rlβ ← R(ω2, rlβ , stβ , t);
kut,β ← KU(pkβ ,mskβ , rlβ , stβ , t).
If DK(skω2,β , kut,β) = ⊥ then return 0; else return 1
– ω1 is a valid user in system α and merges to system β:
(rlβ , stβ) ← MP({pki,mski, rli, sti}i∈{α,β});
skω1,α,β ← MSK({pki,mski, sti}i∈{α,β}, ω1);
skω1,β ← SKU(skω1,α, skω1,α,β);
dkω1,t,β ← DK(skω1,β , kut,β); c3 ← E(pkβ , ω1, t,m3).
If D(dkω1,t,β , c3) = m3 then return 1; else return 0.
3.2 Security of Mergeable and Revocable IBE
We define the selective-mergeable-and-revocable-ID security for mergeable and
revocable IBE scheme. Our security model is based on the model for selective-
revocable-ID security defined in [1].
Definition 4 (sMRID security). Let MRIBE = (S,SK,KU ,DK, E ,D,R,
MP,MSK,SKU) be a mergeable and revocable IBE scheme defined by the secu-
rity parameter k, the maximum number of user N and the number of systems NS.
The adversary first outputs the challenging identity ω∗, a challenging time t∗ and
a subscript of challenging public key i∗, and also some state information it wants
to preserve. Later it is given access to five oracles that correspond to the algo-
rithms of the scheme. The Private Key Generation Oracle OSK(·, ·) takes a
public key pki and an identity ω, runs SK(pki,mski, sti, ω) to return the private
key skω,i.
The Revocation Oracle OR(·, ·) takes input an identity ω and a time t and
runs R(ω, rli, sti, t) to return the updated revocation list rli else return ⊥ if the
identity ω does not exist in any system.
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The Key Update Oracle OKU (·, ·) takes input a public key pki and a time t
and runs KU(pki,mski, rli, sti, t) to return key update kut,i.
The Merge Parameter Oracle OMP(·, ·) takes input public key pkα and public
key pkβ and runs MP({pki, mski, rli, sti}i∈{α,β}) to return updated revocation
list rlβ and state stβ. The parameters of system α are no longer valid.
The Merge Private Key Oracle OMSK(·, ·, ·) takes input an identity ω, a
public key pkα and a public key pkβ and runs MSK({pki,mski, sti}i∈{α,β}, ω)
to return the mergeable private key skω,α,β else return ⊥ if related MP(·, ·) does
not query.
Experiment Expsmrid−cpaMRIBE (k,N,NS)
b ← {0, 1}
(ω∗, t∗, i∗, state) ← A(k,N,NS)
(pp, {pki,mski, rli, sti}i∈{1,...,NS}) ← S(k,N,NS)
(m0,m1, state) ← AOSK,OR,OKU ,OMP ,OMSK(state)
c∗ ← E(pki∗ , ω∗, t∗,mb)
d
$←− AOSK,OR,OKU ,OMP ,OMSK(pki∗ , c∗, state)
If b = d return 1 else return 0.
Note that the following conditions must always hold:
1. m0,m1 ∈ M and |m0| = |m1|.
2. If OSK(·, ·) has been queried on message (pk, ω) then the identity ω has been
initialized or merged in the system with the public key pk.
3. OKU (·, ·) and OR(·, ·) can be queried on time which is greater than or equal to
the time of all previous queries in each system i.e. the adversary is allowed to
query only in a non-decreasing order of time. Also, the oracle OR(·, ·) cannot
be queried on time t if OKU (·, ·) was queried on t.
4. If OR(·, ·) has been queried on (ω∗, t) for any t ≤ t∗ then OSK(·, ·) and
OMSK(·, ·, ·) can be queried on identity ω∗ without constrain. Otherwise,
OSK(·, ·) and OMSK(·, ·, ·) can be queried on identity ω∗ but these queries
cannot derive the secret key skω∗,i∗ in a trivial way. The details are described
as follows.
The relationships between private key generation oracle OSK(·, ·) and merge pri-
vate key generation oracle OMSK(·, ·, ·) has been described in Fig. 1. Suppose the
challenging subscript i∗ is γ (challenging public key is pkγ) and the challenging
identity ω∗ is a non-revoked user, the adversary cannot obtain the secret key
skω,γ and then there are two situations to be considered.
– OSK(pkγ , ω∗) cannot be queried.
– Any queries are equivalent to OSK(pkγ , ω∗) cannot be queried, e.g. if OSK(pkα,
ω∗) and OMSK(ω∗, pkα, pkβ) have been queried, OMSK(ω∗, pkβ , pkγ) can-
not be queried since the former two queries are equivalent to the query
OSK(pkβ , ω∗) and it is trial to gain the private key skγ by continually querying
OMSK(ω∗, pkβ , pkγ).
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We use two database called DSK and DMSK to record the messages queried
to the OSK(ω∗, ·) and OMSK(·, ·, ω∗) oracles, respectively. We can decide if the
adversary can recover the secret key skω∗,i∗ by checking the database DSK and
DMSK.
System α
OSK(pkα, ω∗)
System β
OSK(pkβ , ω∗)
System γ
OSK(pkγ , ω∗)
OMSK(ω∗, pkα, pkβ) OMSK(ω∗, pkβ , pkγ)
Fig. 1. Relationships of OSK(·, ·) and OMSK(·, ·, ·)
We define the advantage of the adversary Advsmrid−cpaMRIBE,A,N,NS (k) as
2 · Pr
[
Expsmrid−cpaMRIBE,A,N,NS (k) = 1
]
− 1
The scheme is said to be sMRID-CPA secure if the function Advsmrid−cpaMRIBE,A,N,NS (k)
is negligible in k for any efficient algorithm A.
4 The Proposed Schemes
Setup (pp, {pki,mski, rli, sti}i∈{1,...,NS}) ← S(k,N,NS): given a security para-
meter k ∈ N, a maximal number of users N ∈ N and a maximal number of
systems NS ∈ N. The key authority defines the valid space of M, I, T , define
the pseudorandom function Fσ : {0, 1}∗ → Z∗p as well as a complete binary tree
T with at least N leaf nodes and does the following.
1. Select bilinear groups (G, p, g) as the public parameter pp which shares to all
systems.
2. For i ∈ {1, ..., NS} do the following:
(a) Randomly choose (ai, ri) ← Z∗p and set g1,i ← gai as well as randomly
choose g2,i, h1,i, h2,i, h3,i ← G.
(b) Return public key pk = (g1,i, g2,i, h1,i, h2,i, h3,i), master secret key mski =
(ai, ri), revocation list rli = ∅ and state sti = T.
Private Key Generation (skω,i, sti) ← SK(pki,mski, sti, ω): given an identity
ω ∈ I, a public key pki, a master key mski and a state sti. The key authority
generates private key skω,i for the receiver with identity ω ∈ I and the updated
state st.
1. Choose an unassigned leaf v from Ti and associate it with ω ∈ I.
2. For all node x ∈ Path(v) do the following:
(a) Retrieve ax from T if it was defined. Otherwise, choose it at random
ax ← Zp and store ax at node x in sti = T.
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(b) Generate random value rx ← Fri(ω‖x) bases on random value ri in master
secret key msk, the identity ω ∈ I as well as the label value x and set
Dx ← gaxω+ai2,i Hg2,i,J,h1,i,h2,i,h3,i(ω)rx ; dx ← grx .
3. Return private key skωi = {(x,Dx, dx)}x∈Path(v) and the updated state sti =
T.
Key Update kut,i ← KU(pki,mski, rli, sti, t): given a public key pki, a master
secret key mski, a key update time t ∈ T , a revocation list rli and a state sti.
For all nodes x ∈ KUNodes(Ti, rli, t).
1. Generate random value rx ← Zp and set
Ex ← gaxt+a2,i Hg2,i,J,h1,i,h2,i,h3,i(t)rx ; ex ← grx .
2. Return key update kut = {(x,Ex, ex)}x∈KUNodes(Ti,rli,t).
Decryption Key Generation dkω,t,i ← DK(skω,i, kut,i): given a private key
skω,i and a key update kut,i. The receiver generates the decryption key dkω,t,i
as follows.
1. Parse skω,i as {(j,Dj , dj)}j∈j , kut,i as {(k,Ek, ek)}k∈k for some set of nodes
	j,	k. If there exists a pair (j, k) s.t. j = k, generate the decryption key
dkω,t,i ← (Dj , Ek, dj , ek).
Otherwise, set the decryption key dkω,t,i as ⊥.
2. Return the decryption key dkω,t,i.
Encryption ci ← E(pki, ω, t,m): given an identity ω ∈ I, a public key pki, an
encryption time t ∈ T and a message m ∈ M. The sender encrypts the message
m ∈ M as follows.
1. Randomly choose z ← Zp and generate ciphertext c1, c2, cω, ct.
c1 ← m · e(g1,i, g2,i)z; c2 ← gz;
cω ← Hg2,i,J,h1,i,h2,i,h3,i(ω)z; ct ← Hg2,i,J,h1,i,h2,i,h3,i(t)z.
2. Return ciphertext c = (ω, t, c1, c2, cω, ct).
Decryption m ← D(dkω,t,i, c): given a decryption key dkω,t,i and a ciphertext
c. The receiver decrypts the ciphertext c as follows:
1. Compute the message m:
m ← c1
(
e(d, cω)
e(D, c2)
) t
t−ω
(
e(e, ct)
e(E, c2)
) ω
ω−t
.
2. Return the message m.
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Revocation rli ← R(ω, rli, sti, t): given an identity to be revoked ω ∈ I, a
revocation list rli, a state sti and a revocation time t ∈ T . The key authority
updates the revocation list rli as follows:
1. For all nodes v associated with identity ω ∈ I add (v, t) to rl as follows:
rli ← rli ∪ (v, t).
2. Return the updated revocation list rli.
Merge Parameter (rlβ , stβ) ← MP({pki,mski, rli, sti}i∈{α,β}): given all the
system parameters {pki,mki, rli, sti}i∈{α,β} from system α and system β. The
key authority generates system parameters which bases on the system parame-
ters in the system β as follows:
1. Update the revocation list rlβ by uniting two revocation lists rlα and rlβ .
rlβ ← rlα ∪ rlβ .
2. Update the state stβ as follows:
(a) Let Tα denote the root node in the binary tree in the system α. Remove
the Tα in the state stα. The detail of the tree structure list in system α
is in Fig. 2.
stα ← stα \ Tα.
Tα
Tα‖0
Tα‖00
...
...
Tα‖01
...
...
Tα‖1
Tα‖10
...
...
Tα‖11
...
...
Fig. 2. Tree structure revocation list in System α
(b) Update the state stβ by uniting it and stα and the details in the Fig. 3.
Note that the new tree is a binary tree except the root node has more
than two children.
stβ ← stα ∪ stβ .
3. Return the updated revocation list rlβ and the updated state stβ .
Merge Private Key skω,α,β ← MSK({pki,mski, sti}i∈{α,β}, ω): given all the
system parameters {pki,mki, sti}i∈{α,β} from system α and system β and an
identity ω ∈ I. The key authority generates the mergeable private key skω,α,β .
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Tβ
Tβ‖0
Tβ‖00
...
...
Tβ‖01
...
...
Tβ‖1
Tβ‖10
...
...
Tβ‖11
...
...
Tα‖0
Tα‖00
...
...
Tα‖01
...
...
Tα‖1
Tα‖10
...
...
Tα‖11
...
...
Fig. 3. Tree structure revocation list after merging α and β
1. Parse pki = (g, g1,i, g2,i, h1,i, h2,i, h3,i) and mki = (ai, ri) for i = α, β.
2. Generate system parameters aα,β , g1,α,β , g2,α,β , h1,α,β , h2,α,β , h3,α,β base on
the system parameters from the system α and the system β.
aα,β = aβ − aα.g1,α,β = g1,β/g1,α; g2,α,β = g2,β/g2,α;
h1,α,β = h1,β/h1,α;h2,α,β = h2,β/h2,α;h3,α,β = h3,β/h3,α.
3. For all node x ∈ Path(v) do the following:
(a) Compute random values rx,α, rx,β and rx,α,β .
rx,α = Frα(ω‖x); rx,β = Frβ (ω‖x); rx,α,β = rx,β − rx,α.
(b) Let ax,α and ax,β denote the value in node in system α and system β,
respectively.
If x is the root node in system α. Then compute
Dx,α,β = g
ax,βω−ax,αω+aα,β
2,α · gax,βω+aβ2,α,β · Hg2,α,J,h1,α,h2,α,h3,α(ω)rx,α,β .
Hg2,α,β ,J,h1,α,β ,h2,α,β ,h3,α,β (ω)
rx,β .
dx,α,β = grx,α,β .
Else, compute
Dx,α,β = g
ax,α,β
2,α · gax,αω+aβ2,α,β · Hg2,α,J,h1,α,h2,α,h3,α(ω)rx,α,β ·
Hg2,α,β ,J,h1,α,β ,h2,α,β ,h3,α,β (ω)
rx,β .
dx,α,β = grx,α,β .
(c) Return skω,α,β = {(x,Dx,α,β , dx,α,β)}x∈Path(v).
Private Key Update skω,β ← SKU(skω,α, skω,α,β): Parse skω,α as
{(i,Di,α, di,α)}i∈i and s˜kω,α,β as {(j, Dj,α,β , dj,α,β}j∈j for some set of nodes
	i and 	j. The receiver generates updated private key skω,β as follows.
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1. For i ∈	i do the following:
skω,β ← (i,Di,α · Di,α,β , di,α · di,α,β)
2. Return the private key skω,β .
5 Security Proof
Definition 5 (Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman). Let G be a prime order
bilinear group generator. The Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) prob-
lem is said to be hard for G if for every efficient adversary A its advantage
AdvdbdhG,B (k) defined as
Pr[Expdbdh−realG,A (k) = 1] − Pr[Expdbdh−randG,A (k) = 1]
is a negligible function in k, and where the experiments are as follows:
Experiment Expdbdh−realG,A (k) Experiment Exp
dbdh−rand
G,A (k)
(G, p, g) ← G(k);x, y, z ← Zp (G, p, g) ← G(k);x, y, z, w ← Zp
X ← gx;Y ← gy;Z ← gz; X ← gx;Y ← gy;Z ← gz;
W ← e(g, g)xyz W ← e(g, g)w
d ← A(k,G, p, g,X, Y, Z,W ) d ← A(k,G, p, g,X, Y, Z,W )
Return d Return d
Theorem 1. Let G be a prime order bilinear group generator and MRIBE be
the associated mergeable and revocable identity-based encryption scheme proposed
above. Then for any adversary A attacking sMRID security (defined in Sect. 3.2)
of MRIBE with N users in each system and NS systems, and making qp private
key generation queries, qr revocation queries, qk key update generation queries,
qm merge parameter queries and qmp merge private key generation queries, there
exists an adversary B solving DBDH problem for G such that
Advsmrid−cpaMRIBE,A,N,NS (k) ≤ 4 · AdvdbdhG,B (k)
Please refer to AppendixA for the detailed proof.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a new variant for Revocalbe Identity Based Encryp-
tion. Our proposed scheme allows not only efficient revocation but also efficient
merging of multiple systems. Compared with all previous RIBE schemes, our
construction does not incur any additional cost. Moreover, the size of the user
private key remains unchanged when multiple systems are merged and there is
no secure channel required for the purpose of key update during the merging
process.
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A Security Proof
Proof. The proof is similar to that of [1], except we meed to handle multiple
systems and the mergeable algorithms. We construct an adversary B for the
DBDH problem associated with G. B gets (k,G, p, g,X, Y, Z,W ) as input and it
has to return a bit d. It is going to use A. For answering oracles, we define the
following four functions. For i, j, l, r ∈ Zp, S = {0, j} define
F1(g2, h1, h2, h3, i, l, r)
def= gl2Hg2,h1,h2,h3(i)
r, F2(r)
def= gr,
F3(g1, g2, i, j, l, r)
def= glΔj,S(i)2
(
g
−f(i)
i2+u(i)
1
(
g
i2+u(i)
2 g
f(i)
)r
)Δ0,S(i)
,
F4(g1, g2, i, r)
def=
(
g
−1
i2+u(i)
1 g
r
)Δ0,S(i)
.
Setup: B receives the challenging message (k,G, p, g,X, Y, Z,W ) and sets the
system parameters as follows.
– B chooses the N,NS ∈ N and sends the security parameter (k,N,NS) to A.
A generates the challenging identity ω∗, the challenging time t∗, the subscript
of challenging public key i∗ and the state for some related information about
(ω∗, t∗, i∗), then sends (ω∗, t∗, i∗, state) to B.
– B chooses a random bit b ← {0, 1} and initializes the database D,DSK,
DMSK ← ∅, where D is used to record the historical information of the chal-
lenging identity ω∗, and DSK,DMSK records information of the challenging
identity ω∗ to verify whether to abort.
– B simulates the system parameters for all NS systems. B sets public parameter
pp = (G, p, g) and randomly picks a value ir ← {1, 2, ..., NS}, where the
challenging identity ω∗ is initialized in the system with public key pkir . Then,
B updates the database D ← ( 	pkω∗ , ω∗), where 	pkω∗ ← 	pkω∗ ∪ {pkir}. ∀j ∈
{1, 2, ..., NS} then:
1. Randomly pick and store rj , r1,j , r2,j ← Z∗p in the system j and generate
the parameters g1,j and g2,j .
g1,j ← Xr1,j , g2,j ← Y r2,j .
2. Pick random second-degree polynomials f(x), u(x) with coefficients in Zp
s.t. u(x) = −x2 for x = ω∗, t∗, o.w. u(x) = −x2. ∀i = {1, 2, 3} then: set
hi,j ← gu(i)2,j gf(i).
3. Set the public key pkj ← (g, g1,j , g2,j , h1,j , h2,j , h3,j).
– B sends the public parameter pp and public keys {pki}i∈{1,2,...,NS} to A.
– B simulates the revocation list and the binary tree. ∀j = {1, 2, ..., NS} then:
let rlj be an empty set and Tj be a binary tree with at least N leaf nodes. B
picks a leaf node v∗ from Tir , where the challenging identity ω
∗ is assigned
to the leaf v∗, and chooses a random bit rev ← {0, 1}, where 0 means ω∗ is
a non-revoked user, otherwise, he is a revoked user.
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OSK(pki, ω): A issues up to qp private key generation queries. B responds to a
query on message (pki, ω) as follows.
– If ω = ω∗, B simulates the private key skω,i for the challenging identity ω∗.
1. If rev = 0, set DSK ← DSK ∪ {pki} and abort if A is able to obtain
the secret key skω∗,i∗ by checking the transactions in database DSK and
DMSK in Fig. 1.
2. Else set v ← v∗. ∀x ∈ Path(v) then:
(a) Set rx ← Fri(ω∗‖x), where mski = (ai, ri).
(b) If lx then randomly choose lx ← Zp and store lx in node x.
(c) Set (Dx, dx) and update private key skω∗,i ← skω∗,i ∪ (x,Dx, dx).
Dx ← F1(g2,i, h1,i, h2,i, h3,i, ω∗, lx, rx), dx ← F2(rx).
– If ω = ω∗, B simulates the private key skω,i for the identity ω. ∀x ∈ Path(v)
then:
1. Set rx ← Fri(ω‖x), where mski = (ai, ri).
2. If lx then randomly choose lx ← Zp and store lx in node x.
3. If rev = 0, set (Dx, dx) and update private key skω,i ← skω,i∪(x,Dx, dx).
Dx ← F3(g1,i, g2,i, ω, t∗, lx, rx), dx ← F4(g1,i, g2,i, ω, rx).
4. If rev = 1, simulate the private key skω,i depends on the Path(v) and
Path(v∗).
(a) ∀x ∈ (Path(v) \ Path(v∗)) then: set (Dx, dx) and update private key
skω,i ← skω,i ∪ (x,Dx, dx).
Dx ← F3(g1,i, g2,i, ω, t∗, lx, rx), dx ← F4(g1,i, g2,i, ω, rx).
(b) ∀x ∈ (Path(v) ∩ Path(v∗)) then: set (Dx, dx) and update private key
skω,i ← skω,i ∪ (x,Dx, dx).
Dx ← F3(g1,i, g2,i, ω, ω∗, lx, rx), dx ← F4(g1,i, g2,i, ω, rx).
– Return the private key skω,i = {(x,Dx, dx)}x∈Path(v).
OR(ω, t): A issues up to qr revocation queries. B responds to a query on message
(ω, t) as follows. If (·, ω) ∈ D, for all leaf nodes v associated with identity ω add
(v, t) to revocation list rli ← rli ∪ (v, t), then return rli else return ⊥.
OKU (pki, t): A issues up to qk key update generation queries. B responds to a
query on message (pki, t) as follows.
– If t = t∗, B simulates the key update kut,i for the system i.
1. If rev = 0, ∀x ∈ KUNodes(T, rl, t) then: rx ← Z∗p, set Ex and dx and
update kut,i ← kut,i ∪ (x,Ex, ex).
Ex ← F3(g1,i, g2,i, t, t∗, lx, rx), ex ← F4(g1,i, g2,i, t, rx).
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2. If rev = 1, simulate the key kut depends on the Path(v) and Path(v∗).
(a) ∀x ∈ (KUNodes(T, rl, t)\Path(v∗)) then: rx ← Z∗p, set Ex and dx and
update kut,i ← kut,i ∪ (x,Ex, ex).
Ex ← F3(g1,i, g2,i, t, t∗, lx, rx), ex ← F4(g1,i, g2,i, t, rx).
(b) ∀x ∈ (KNodes(T, rl, t) ∩ Path(v∗)) then: rx ← Z∗p, set Ex and dx and
update kut,i ← kut,i ∪ (x,Ex, ex).
Ex ← F3(g1,i, g2,i, t, ω∗, lx, rx), ex ← F4(g1,i, g2,i, t, rx).
– If t = t∗, B simulates the key update kut,i in the challenging time t∗ for the
system i.
1. If rev = 1 and ∀t ≤ t∗ we have that (ω∗, t) ∈ rli∗ then abort since
challenging identity ω∗ must be revoked when rev = 1.
2. Else, ∀x ∈ KUNodes(T, rl, t) then: rx ← Z∗p, set Ex and dx and update
kut,i ← kut,i ∪ (x,Ex, ex).
Ex ← F1(g2,i, h1,i, h2,i, h3,i, t∗, lx, rx), ex ← F2(rx).
– Return the key update kut,i = {(x,Ex, ex)}x∈KUNodes(T,rl,t).
OMP(pkα, pkβ): A issues up to qm merge parameter generation queries. B
responds to a query on message (pkα, pkβ) by updating the revocation list rlβ ,
state stβ and the database D as follows.
– Update the revocation list and state rlβ ← rlα ∪ rlβ , stβ ← stβ ∪ stα \ Tα.
– If ω∗ is involved in the system with pkα, then updating the database D.
∀( 	pk, ·) ∈ D then set len = | 	pk|, if pk[len] = pkα, 	pk ← 	pk ∪ pkβ .
– Return the updated revocation list rlβ and state stβ .
OMSK(ω, pkα, pkβ): A issues up to qmp merge private key generation queries. B
responds to a query on message (ω, pkα, pkβ).
– If ω = ω∗, B simulates the private key skω,α,β for challenging identity ω.
1. If rev = 0, set DMSK ← DMSK ∪ {(pkα, pkβ)} and abort if A is able
to obtain the secret key skω∗,i∗ by checking the transactions in database
DSK and DMSK in Fig. 1.
2. Else set v ← v∗. ∀x ∈ Path(v) then:
(a) Set rx,α ← Grα(ω‖x) and rx,β ← Frβ (ω‖x).
(b) Set (Dx,α,β , dx,α,β) and update private key skω,α,β ← skω,α,β ∪
(x,Dx,α,β , dx,α,β), where the union symbol is used to combine the
secret keys since this algorithm will return secret keys belong to
Path(v).
Dx,α,β =
F1(g2,β , h1,β , h2,β , h3,β , ω, lx,β , rx,β)
F1(g2,α, h1,α, h2,α, h3,α, ω, lx,α, rx,α)
, dx,α,β =
F2(rx,β)
F2(rx,α)
.
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– If ω = ω∗, B simulates the private key skω,α,β for the identity ω. ∀x ∈ Path(v)
then:
1. Set rx,α ← Grα(ω‖x) and rx,β ← Grβ (ω‖x).
2. If rev = 0, set (Dx, dx) and update private key skω ← skω ∪ (x,Dx, dx),
where the union symbol is used for the same reason in previous section.
Dx,α,β =
F3(g1,β , g2,β , ω, t∗, lx,β , rx,β)
F3(g1,α, g2,α, ω, t∗, lx,α, rx,α)
, dx,α,β =
F4(g1,β , g2,β , ω, rx,β)
F4(g1,α, g2,α, ω, rx,α)
.
3. If rev = 1, simulate the private key skω depends on the Path(v) and
Path(v∗).
(a) ∀x ∈ (Path(v) \ Path(v∗)) then: set (Dx, dx) and update private key
skω ← skω ∪ (x,Dx, dx).
Dx,α,β =
F3(g1,β , g2,β , ω, t∗, lx,β , rx,β)
F3(g1,α, g2,α, ω, t∗, lx,α, rx,α)
, dx,α,β =
F4(g1,β , g2,β , ω, rx,β)
F4(g1,α, g2,α, ω, rx,α)
.
(b) ∀x ∈ (Path(v) ∩ Path(v∗)) then: set (Dx, dx) and update private key
skω ← skω ∪ (x,Dx, dx).
Dx,α,β =
F3(g1,β , g2,β , ω, ω∗, lx,β , rx,β)
F3(g1,α, g2,α, ω, ω∗, lx,α, rx,α)
, dx,α,β =
F4(g1,β , g2,β , ω, rx,β)
F4(g1,α, g2,α, ω, rx,α)
.
4. Return the private key skω,α,β = {(x,Dx,α,β , dx,α,β)}x∈Path(v).
Output: A outputs two message m0 and m1. B picks a random bit b ← {0, 1}
and generates the challenging ciphertext c∗ = (c∗1, c
∗
2, cω∗ , ct∗) and then sends c
∗
to A. A outputs a bit d. If b = d, B outputs 1 else output 0.
c∗1 = mb · W r1,ω∗ ·r2,ω∗ , c∗2 = Z, cω∗ = Zf(ω
∗), ct∗ = Zf(t
∗).
If any oracles abort, B outputs 1.
A.1 Analysis
Let sreal, srand denote the events that none of the oracles abort in
Expdbdh−realG,B (k), Exp
dbdh−rand
G,B (k) respectively. Then
Pr[sreal] = Pr[srand] ≥ 1/2.
The probability that OSK(pki, ω), OMSK(ω, pkα, pkβ) and OKU (pki, t) oracles
abort depends on the bit rev which are chosen independently from whether B is
in Expdbdh−realG,B (k) or Exp
dbdh−rand
G,B (k). So, Pr[sreal] = Pr[srand].
OSK(pki, ω) and OMSK(·, ·, ω∗) oracles can be queried on ω∗ without con-
strain only if OR(ω, t) oracle was queried on (ω∗, t) for any t ≤ t∗. Thus, we
have
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Pr[ω = ω∗] ≤ Pr[(ω∗, t) ∈ rlω∗ ,∀t ≤ t∗]
⇒ 1 − Pr[ω = ω∗] ≥ Pr[(ω∗, t) ∈ rlω∗ ,∀t ≤ t∗]
⇒ 1 − Pr[ω = ω∗] ≥ Pr[(t = t∗) ∧ (ω∗, t) ∈ rlω∗ ,∀t ≤ t∗]
We see that OSK(pki, ω) oracles abort if ω = ω∗ and OKU (t) oracle aborts if
rev = 1, t = t∗ and ∃t ≤ t∗ (ω∗, t) ∈ rlω∗ . Thus,
Pr[sreal] = Pr[(rev = 0) ∧ (ω = ω∗)]
+ Pr[(rev = 1) ∧ (t = t∗) ∧ ((ω∗, t) ∈ rlω∗ ,∀t ≤ t∗)]
= Pr[rev = 0] · Pr[ω = ω∗]
+ Pr[rev = 1] · Pr[(t = t∗) ∧ ((ω∗, t) ∈ rlω∗ ,∀t ≤ t∗)]
≤ 1/2 · Pr[ω = ω∗] + 1
2
(1 − Pr[ω = ω∗]) ≤ 1/2
B simulates the exact experiment Expsmrid−cpaMRIBE,A,N,NS (k) for A when B is in
Expdbdh−realG,B (k) and none of the oracles abort. So,
Pr
[
Expdbdh−realG,B (k) = 1|sreal
]
≥ Pr
[
Expsmrid−cpaMRIBE,A,N,NS (k) = 1
]
.
When B is Expdbdh−randG,B (k) and none of the oracles abort then as explained
earlier bit b is information-theoretically hidden from A. So,
Pr
[
Expdbdh−randG,B (k) = 1|srand
]
≤ 1/2.
Also, since B outputs 1 when either of the oracles aborts, so
Pr
[
Expdbdh−realG,B (k) = 1|sreal
]
= 1,
Pr
[
Expdbdh−randG,B (k) = 1|srand
]
= 1.
Thus,
AdvdbdhG,B (k) = Pr
[
Expdbdh−realG,B (k) = 1
]
− Pr
[
Expdbdh−randG,B (k) = 1
]
≥ 1/2 ·
(
Pr
[
Expdbdh−realG,B (k) = 1|sreal
]
− 1
2
)
≥ 1/2 · 1
2
·
(
2 · Pr
[
Expdbdh−realG,B (k) = 1|sreal
]
− 1
)
≥ 1/2 · Advsmrid−cpaMRIBE,A,N,NS (k).
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